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THE PATRIOT ACT
AND BUSH'S MILITARY TRIBUNALS:
EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OR ATTACKS
ON CIVIL LIBERTIES?
John Lichtenthal
"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety
deserve neither liberty nor safety." - Benjamin Franklin (Inscribed on the
pedestal of the Statue of Liberty)
The "War on Terrorism" has raged on for two years. To combat terrorism
abroad, the "war" has carried American fighting men and women around
the world to places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. Here at
home, the government has been implementing tools against threats of domestic terrorism. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act ("Patriot Act")' of 2001 and President Bush's Military Order of November 13,
2001, have been two important tools in the fight against terrorism. These
two initiatives have drawn a great deal of criticism from the civil liberties
community due to the sometimes-drastic changes that these have made to
our legal system.
The enforcement of new, restrictive, security-based laws since September 11, 2001, is a major threat to our civil liberties. While civil liberties
in America have historically suffered during times of war, the nature of the
new "War on Terrorism" poses a threat that has not previously existed.
There has been no Congressional declaration of war, and there is no immediate end to the "war" in sight. The infringement on our civil liberties, left
unchecked, is likely to continue indefinitely and could easily worsen.
Many of the enforcement provisions of the Patriot Act as well as
President George W. Bush's Military Order 2 are unconstitutional; or at least
they seem to be. While the Patriot Act and Military Order are at first glance
violations of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has historically been sympathetic to the kinds of arguments
and justifications that the Bush administration has used to support its infringement of civil liberties. Using racist and questionable rulings3 from the
1 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
2

See, e.g. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, infra note 16, Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, infra note 23, Downes v. Bidwell, infra note 31, Korematsu v. United
States, infra note 125, see also Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the
3
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Supreme Court, a strong case can be made for the constitutionality of the
Bush initiatives.
Ultimately, however, these enforcement provisions are unwarranted
and unnecessary attacks on our civil liberties. The possible long-term effects of these initiatives need to be evaluated. We need also to look to the
past and come to terms with the darker side of American history that led to
the constitutional arguments supporting the Bush initiatives.
September 11, 2001, changed our nation and the world. We are on
a quest to make our nation and the entire world safer, but we must be careful what means we choose to reach that end. Are we to revive state-supported racism from our past to help us determine our immigration policies?
Are we to allow the unchecked invocation of executive powers that are
reserved for the most extreme circumstances when there is no definite end
in sight?
Currently, the Bush initiatives relate most to those who are not citizens of the United States. Part I of this essay will look at how terrorism is
defined, and the consequences of that definition. Part II will offer a historical evaluation of the effects of the Patriot Act on "others" - meaning those
in our country who come from momentarily unpopular racial backgrounds.
Part III will look at the constitutionality of the Bush administration's military proceedings and orders. Part IV will briefly evaluate the future of the
Patriot Act.
PART I: THE DEFINITION OF "TERRORISM"

Section 802 of the Patriot Act amends the criminal code, 18 U.S.C.
2331, to add a new definition of "domestic terrorism" that includes activities that: (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, (ii) to influence the policy
of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, or (iii)
to affect the conduct of the federal or a state government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the terri4
torial jurisdiction of the United States.
"Acts dangerous to human life" is a phrase that is extremely broad
in scope that could easily encompass many domestic political groups, such
as Act Up, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Operation

Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "PlenaryPower" Justificationfor On-Going Abuses
of Human Rights, infra note 20..
4 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56 § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001).
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Rescue, and the Puerto Rican Vieques demonstrators.5 This is an expansion
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19966 (AEDPA),
where "the designation of a terrorist organization was made by the secretary
of State and was defined as any ... organization engaged in terrorist activity that threatens the security of the United States. The definition of national security included economic interests of the United States, and the
'7
definition of terrorism included almost any act of force."
While the 1996 definition of terrorism is also quite broad, it was at
least restricted to foreign groups designated by the Secretary of State to be
terrorist organizations. Under the Patriot Act, the Secretary of State can
designate any group that has ever engaged in violent activity a "terrorist
organization." 8 Aware that this could pertain to domestic political groups,
Attorney General John Ashcroft recently "assured the Senate that the U.S.
government's definition of terrorism has, since 1983, included as terrorists
only 'those who perpetrate premeditated, politically motivated violence
against noncombatant targets.' If that is true, it certainly begs the question
of why the Bush Administration felt the need to redefine 'terrorism' to include a wide variety of domestic criminal acts." 9
It goes without saying that American citizens who violate this or
any other law are subject to the jurisdiction of American criminal courts,
and are afforded the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 10 For noncitizens, however, the consequences are far more menacing: Section 411 of
the Patriot Act allows for the deportation of aliens for acts of terrorism.11
"Moreover, [the Patriot Act] allows the government to detain 'aliens' suspected of such activity for up to seven days without bringing criminal
charges or initiating deportation proceedings. Aliens may be detained
based solely on the Attorney General's unreviewed belief that the alien is
See John W. Whitehead, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A Constitutional Analysis of the USA PatriotAct and the Justice Departments' Antiterrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2002).
5

6

Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).

Jacob R. Lilly, National Security at What Price?: A Look Into Civil Liberty
Concerns in the Information Age Under the USA PatriotAct of 2001 and a Proposed Constitutional Test for Future Legislation, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 447, 457 (2003).
8
ACLU, How the Anti-Terrorism Bill Allows for Detention of People Engaging
in Innocent AssociationalActivity, (2001) at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/
7

NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=9152&c=l 11, last visited April 22, 2004.
9 Whitehead, supra note 2, at 1093, 1094.
10 Or are they? See discussion of "military tribunals" in Part III infra.
11

USA PATRIOT Act, § 411, 115 Stat. 272, 345 (2001).
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involved in terrorist activity." 12 Aliens, then, can be detained without any
oversight or control by the courts (further discussion in Part II, infra). Furthermore, simply paying dues to any one of these groups is an offence punishable by deportation, regardless of whether the person who paid dues
13
knew of the group's designation.
It must be remembered that "non-citizen" includes all resident
aliens, be they legal or illegal, temporary or permanent. Understanding the
consequences of the Bush Initiatives on civil liberties, then, requires a review of immigration law, past and present.
PART

II:

IMMIGRATION

Not only does the Patriot Act subject aliens to deportation, it also
substantially changes immigration law. Sections 411 and 412 of the Patriot
Act deal with immigration law. These sections grant the executive broad
powers over immigrants, such as authority to take custody of aliens with
minimal (or no) judicial oversight. 14 The provisions and consequences of
these sections are based on and justified by a long history of civil rights
abuses in our nation's immigration laws.
A. The Birth of Immigration Policy: the Chinese Exclusion Acts and
Plenary Power
The Constitution gives Congress the power to "establish a uniform
Rule of Naturalization ...throughout the United States."' 15 The Supreme
Court first ruled on immigration law in the Chinese Exclusion Case.16 This
ruling gave birth to the "Plenary Power" doctrine, asserting:
[I]f. . .the government of the United States, through its
legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners
of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate
with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no
actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are
subjects. 17
Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, JudicialDeference, and
the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUMAN
12

RIGHTS L. REV. 1, 35-36 (2002).
13 ACLU, supra note 4.
14 USA PATRIOT Act, §§ 411, 412, 115 Stat. 272.
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
16 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581; 9 S.Ct. 623 (1889).
17 Id. at 606.
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In short, Plenary Power is a doctrine centered on the idea that Congress and the Executive branch have nearly complete control over immigration and are generally not subject to judicial review. The Constitutional
basis for the doctrine lies in Congress' powers over naturalization, the executive's enforcement of that power, and the executive's dominance over foreign affairs.1 8 Naturalization is not mentioned at all in the Constitution
under the powers of the judiciary. The Supreme Court's adoption of the
Plenary Power doctrine started the judiciary down a road of racism and
broad deference to the executive and legislative branches that, as will be
shown, it would seldom deviate from.
In the The Chinese Exclusion Case 9, a Chinese-born resident of

California left the United States for a period of just over a year, and wished
to return. According to the law at the time, and according to the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 with China, the man had a legal right of entry.20 A
few days before his arrival in the port of San Francisco, a new federal law
went into effect excluding all Chinese workers, regardless of whether they
2
had undergone the proper procedures to leave and return or not. 1
Writing for the court .... Justice Field acknowledged that

the statute did conflict with the treaty, but said the 1888 law
would nonetheless be enforced under the "last in time rule,"
according to which courts will enforce a later-enacted federal statute that conflicts with a treaty even if the result is a
violation of international law. This is but one of several
similar doctrines that make it difficult to get international
law enforced in U.S. courts. Others include the courts' refusal to enforce treaties or treaty provisions deemed "nonand/
self-executing," and the courts' deference to congress
22
or the executive branch on "political questions.
Important themes were set that would permanently affect immigration law. First, the Court would uphold openly racist immigration law.
Second, the Court would not uphold international laws or treaties in the face
of American immigration laws passed subsequent to the treaty or interna18

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, art. II, §§ 1, 2.

19

Supra note 16.

20

Burlingame Treaty, July 28, 1868, U.S.-P.R.C., 16 Stat 739, T.S. No. 48. Natsu

Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Plenary
Power" Justificationfor On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 14
(2003).
21

Saito, supra note 15.

22

Id. at 15.
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tional agreement. Third, thanks to the Plenary Power doctrine, the legislative and executive branches would be left to determine immigration policy
with minimal interference from the Court.
This holding was extended in 1893 with Fong Yue Ting v. United
States23 In this case, the Court upheld the deportation of Chinese workers
who could not obtain certificates of residence because the governing statute
required the application to be accompanied by the testimony of "at least one
credible white witness. '24 The Court cited its earlier ruling in the Chinese
Exclusion Case25, and reasoned that "[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards
becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance
into the country. ' '26 Race became (and would remain) an important factor in
immigration law.
Both the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting are still binding precedent, and are still cited in immigration cases. In 1985, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the American interdiction of Haitian
refugees in international waters in Jean v. Nelson.27 The court found that
noncitizens who have not been admitted to the country "have no constitutional rights with regard to their applications and must be content to accept
28
whatever statutory rights and privileges they are granted by Congress.
The case for civil rights and liberties was not, however, completely
lost in these early Supreme Court battles.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.' These provisions
are universal in their application to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or nationality; and the equal protection of the
laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. Applying
this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must
be concluded that all persons within the territory of the
23

149 U.S. 698; 13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893).

26

Id. at 727.
Supra note 16.
Id. at 707.

27

727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1985).

28

Id. at 968.

24
25
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United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by
those amendments. .. 29
The rights of a noncitizen from now on would be determined primarily by
location. An alien within the jurisdiction of the United States was subject
to constitutional protection. 30
However, immigration law based on Plenary Power was here to
stay. While race could not affect an alien's rights once he or she was within
the territory of the United States, it remained an acceptable factor for exclusion and/or deportation. In the same year that the Supreme Court ruled that
aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States were reached by the Constitution, they also reaffirmed Plenary Power in Downes v. Bidwell.31
Justice Brown, who just five years earlier had written the
Court's opinion upholding legalized segregation in Plessy
v. Ferguson, said that we should not worry about the possibility of despotism resulting from the exercise of plenary
power because "there are certain principles of natural justice inherent in the Anglo-Saxon character which need no
expression in constitutions or statutes to give them effect or
to secure dependencies against legislation manifestly hos32
tile to their real interests.1
Plenary Power has a dubious beginning not limited only to Chinese
immigration. The Supreme Court invoked the still-forming doctrine of Plenary Power to extend federal criminal jurisdiction into Native American
reservations in United States v. Kagama.3 3 The court found that Native
Americans "were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States,
not as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a
separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relaWong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896) (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064
29

(1886)).
Executive action against aliens outside of United States territory falls under the
executive's powers as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and is subject to
some Congressional limitations. See, e.g., War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No.
193-48, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000)). U.S.
citizens outside of U.S. territory are still afforded Constitutional protection, how30

ever. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 254 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957).

182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770 (1901).
Saito, supra note 15, at 29 (quoting Downes, Id. at 280).
33 118 U.S. 375, 6 S. Ct. 1109 (1886).
31

32
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tions. '' 34 Furthermore, the exercise of Congressional authority in the reservations was necessary for the safety of the Native Americans and those
35
around them.
Plenary Power was also used as a justification for the creation of
colonies in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. In Downes v. Bidwell,
the Supreme Court held that:
there is a provision [in the Constitution] that 'new States
may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.' These
words, of course, carry the Constitution with them, but
nothing is said regarding the acquisition of new territories
or the extension of the Constitution over them. The liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into all our
contiguous territories has undoubtedly fostered the impression that it went there by its own force, but there in nothing
in the Constitution itself, and little in the interpretation put
36
upon it, to confirm that impression.
This holding is still valid. "As recently as 1996, the House Committee on
Resources found that the 'compact' currently governing U.S.-Puerto Rican
relations does not meet the United Nations' standards for self-government
and that Congress still holds the power to unilaterally revoke local self'37
government and U.S. citizenship.
38
Plenary Power is an outdated, unnecessary, and racist theory. It
has been used to justify the exclusion and deportation of immigrants based
solely on race, the deprivation of Native Americans of sovereignty, and the
taking and holding of colonies that are deprived of self-determination.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court still recognizes the supremacy of Congres39
sional power in the area of immigration.

34

Id. at 381-82.

35 Id.
36

at 384.

Downes, 182 U.S. at 286.

37

Saito, supra note 15, at 28.

38

Saito, supra note 15; Joo, supra note 8.

39 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695, 121 S. Ct. 2491 (2001), which
references Plenary Power and states: "we nowhere deny the right of Congress to
remove aliens, to subject them to supervision with conditions when released from
detention, or to incarcerate them where appropriate for violations of those condi-

tions .... Nor do the cases before us require us to consider the political branches'

authority to control entry into the United States."
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The Detention of Noncitizens

"Freedom from imprisonment - from government custody, detention, or
other forms of physical restraint - lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Due Process] Clause protects. '40 Since the Court in Wong Wing and Yick
Wo held that the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments apply to aliens
within the jurisdiction of the United States, 41 "with the exception of enemy
aliens during wartime, the Supreme Court has upheld civil detention only
where it is justified by an individualized showing of need after a full and
fair adversarial hearing. This principle is so basic that it brooks virtually no
dissent. Yet... recent immigration statutes, regulations, and practices suggest that in the immigration setting we have lost sight of these very basic
principles." 42
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has restricted Plenary Power to
substantive criteria governing the admission and removal of aliens. When it
came to the removal of aliens, the Supreme Court, in Yamataya v. Fisher,
stated:
[T]his Court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in "due process of law" as understood at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is
that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in
43
respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends.
While the application of due process to immigration detention was articulated unambiguously in Yamataya, the subsequent history of the detention
of aliens saw an erosion of aliens' due process rights.
The right to liberty is not absolute, but can be restricted
only in accordance with both procedural and substantive
due process. Accordingly, when the government takes an
individual into custody ....

it must have a legitimate sub-

stantive reason for the detention. The writ of habeas corpus
40

Id. at 690.

See Wong Wing and Yick Wo, supra note 23. See also, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon,
326 U.S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443 (1945).
42 David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due ProcessLimits on Immigration Detention,
51 EMORY L.J. 1003 (2002).
43 189 U.S. 86, 100-101, 23 S. Ct. 611 (1903).
41
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in turn ensures that individuals will have recourse to a court
to challenge the legality of their detention."

When not applied to individuals as punishment in a criminal case, detention
can only be allowed "in certain special and 'narrow' non-punitive 'circumstances' .'4 This most notably applies to the setting of bail and holding of
criminal suspects before a trial.46
Non-punitive or preventative detention has been upheld for immigration cases as well. 47 As with the holding of criminal suspects before
trial, detention is permissible when there is a risk that the individual will
flee or be a danger to the community.
With the exception of [enemy aliens in time of war], implicit in all of the Court's decisions regarding detention is
the notion that the justification for detention must be particularized to the individual. Just as we cannot impose criminal sanctions on individuals absent a determination of
individual culpability, so too we cannot lock up a person
absent a showing that there is a demonstrated need to lock
48
up that specific person.
When it comes to citizens of the United States, the Supreme Court
has been very suspicious of statutes that hold members of a group responsible for the actions of others. 49 In the case of immigrants, however, the
Court has granted far more deference to the executive branch, congruent
with the doctrine of Plenary Power and contrary to Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights. In Carlson v. Landon,50 where two immigrants who
were members of the Communist Party were held without bail pending a
determination on their deportability, the Supreme Court held that aliens can
be held responsible for the acts or philosophies of the groups to which they
Cole, supra note 36, at 1008-1009 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
356 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S. Ct.
2095 (1987); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S. Ct. 2271 (2001)).
45 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana,504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.
Ct. 1780 (1992)).
46 See, e.g., Salerno, supra note 38.
47 See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952).
48 Cole, supra note 36, at 1010 (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 22425, 81 S.Ct. 1469 (1961)).
49 See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409 (1982); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 419 (1967); Aptherker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500 84 S.Ct. 1659 (1964).
50 342 U.S. 524, 72 S.Ct. 525 (1952).
44
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belong, saying that "evidence of membership plus personal activity in supporting and extending the [Communist] Party's philosophy concerning violence gives adequate ground for detention."5 1
One year later, the Court, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex. rel.
Mezei,52 expanded the government's power to hold aliens without individual determinations of necessity to permit indefinite detentions. Citing the
Chinese Exclusion Case,53 the Court invoked the doctrine of Plenary Power
by stating that "respondent's right to enter the United States depends on the
congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative mandate. '54 Therefore, the alien in this case was required to stay on
Ellis Island indefinitely because the Island constituted shelter and not a
landing on American territory. 55 Furthermore, the Court held that the Attorney General, acting for the President, "may exclude without a hearing when
the exclusion is based on confidential information the disclosure of which
5' 6
may be prejudicial to the public interest.
In 1996, Congress amended immigration law by imposing the
mandatory detention of criminal aliens while they were in deportation proceedings,57 which "raise[s] serious constitutional problems because [it] require[s] detention even where there is no need for preventative detention,
that is, where the alien is neither a risk of flight nor a danger to the
'
community. "58
The Supreme Court in Zadvydas refuted the notion, however, that
aliens can be held indefinitely. 59 Again citing the Chinese Exclusion Case,
the Court held that Congress's power is subject to constitutional limitations 60 and that "if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should
hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute. '61 In response to this ruling, Attorney General Ashcroft stated that
Id. at 541.
345 U.S. 206, 73 S. Ct. 625 (1953).
53 Id. at 210.
54 Id. at 216 (citing Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590, 72 S.Ct. 512
(1952)).
55 Id. at 215.
56 Id. at 210-211.
57 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2000).
58 Cole, supra note 36, at 1022.
59 See supra note 33.
60 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-942, 103
S. Ct. 2764 (1983)).
61 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
51

52
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"although the [D]epartment [of Justice] stands ready to obey court orders
...it will endeavor to detain such aliens on other grounds if possible. '62
The preventative and indefinite detention of aliens is a serious curtailment of due process rights, and was justified by the racist doctrine of
Plenary Power. That trend continues and is greatly expanded in the Patriot
Act.
Section 412 of the Patriot Act also raises serious due process concerns. It gives the Attorney General new power to
detain aliens without a hearing and without a showing that
they pose a danger or a flight risk. He need only certify
that he has "reasonable grounds to believe" that the alien is
"described in" various anti-terrorism provisions of the [Immigration and Naturalization Act], and the alien is then
63
subject to potentially indefinite detention.
The Attorney General also has the right to detain aliens without charge for
seven days,64 which "appears to be directly contrary to the Supreme Court's
holding that the Fourth Amendment requires that persons arrested be
brought before a judge promptly... [and] [t]he Fourth Amendment applies
to persons living in the United States, including aliens." 65
The detained alien does, however, have the right to habeas corpus
review of the Attorney General's certification decision,
[B]ut the scope of that review will un-doubtedly be the subject of considerable dispute. The government is almost certain to argue that the habeas court is restricted to asking
whether the Attorney General had any basis for his belief,
based solely on the evidence available to him at the time of
certification, and that the court has no authority to ascertain
whether in fact the alien falls within the specified grounds
of inadmissibility or removability. If courts accept that
view, the alien would have no opportunity to present contradictory evidence, but would be limited to challenging the
62 Batoul Makki, The United States Supreme Court Holds Indefinite Detention of

DeportableAliens to be Unconstitutional:Where Do They Go From Here? 79 U.

DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 497 (2002).
63 Cole, supra note 36, at 1026.
64 USA PATRIOT Act § 412(a)(5), 115 Stat. 272, 351 (2001).
65 Cole, supra note 36, at 1027 (citing County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500
U.S. 44, 56, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991), INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.
Ct. 3479 (1984)).
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sufficiency of the government's record. Such a process
would afford the alien no meaningful opportunity to be
66
heard.
Furthermore, the government is allowed the use of secret evidence
in its proceedings against aliens. The Supreme Court first articulated this in
U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.67 In this case, a German refugee of

World War II, who had fled to England and worked "honorably" for the
Royal Air Force, then worked as a highly praised civilian employee of the
U.S. War Department in Germany and married a U.S. citizen, was denied
entry into the United States. 68 The Court, relying on Plenary Power, allowed her exclusion on the basis of undisclosed evidence. 69 The Court then
upheld the use of secret evidence again in Mezei, 70 because the Attorney
General asserted "the disclosure [of the evidence in question] would be
prejudicial to the public interest."'71 These two rulings came at the start of
the Cold War, noticeably right after the Soviet Union detonated its first
nuclear weapon and many in the United States were worried about Soviet
72
spies infiltrating the country.
Since then, as the Cold War was ending, the issue was addressed by
73
the District of Columbia's Circuit Court of Appeals in Rafendie v. I.N.S.
In this case, the Court ruled that the use of secret evidence was forbidden.
The issue came up again in 1995 in the Ninth Circuit with the case of American-ArabAnti-DiscriminationComm. v. Reno, 74 which also held that secret
evidence was unconstitutional. This case was reviewed and vacated by the

66
67

Cole, supra note 36, at 1027-1028.
338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950).

71

Id.
Id. at 543-544.
345 U.S. at 215.
Id. at 208.

72

"The [Patriot] Act threatens to resurrect many of the abuses reminiscent of the

68
69
70

Cold War. For example, in 1991 Congress repealed the much-criticized provision
of the McCarran-Walter Act, which permitted the government to deny entry to any
immigrant because their speech or writings supported Communism. Section 4511
of the [Patriot] Act resurrects this provision but substitutes terrorism for Communism." Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PIT'. L.
REV. 767,785-786 (2002).
73 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
74

70 F3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Supreme Cour ,,75 however, which held that immigration law "deprives the
federal courts of jurisdiction" over the use of secret evidence. 76
Currently, immigration proceedings that are taking place (that are
"related" to September 11, 2001) have been closed to the public. 77 Not only
is secret evidence to be used against immigrants; the immigration proceedings are also not subject to public scrutiny (see Part 111(c) infra). First made
as an Immigration Judge's order, 78 this policy was later backed up and modified by the INS "with an interim rule allowing immigration judges to close
hearings to protect sensitive law enforcement or national security information. '79 "On June 28, at the Bush administration's request, the Supreme
Court, without explanation, issued [a] stay, thus preventing the hearings
80
from being opened to the public.
C.

Immigration Law as Law Enforcement?

Deportation has always been a part of immigration law. Traditionally, removal came as the result of "violation of immigration laws, such as overstaying a visa or working without permission, . . . [or] the commission of
criminal offenses or moral failings, including drug addiction or pauperism."'" This changed drastically in the 1980s and 1990s. Beginning with
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198882 and reaching a climax with the Illegal
83
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
the list of offenses that make aliens removable has substantially increased;
furthermore, many of the offenses mandate deportation. 84 Many of the
newer mandated deportable offenses are defined as "aggravated felonies," a
75

525 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 936 (1999).

Id. at 492.
Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality after September 11? American
Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 8 (2002)
(quoting The Creppy Directive, (ACLU, New York, NY 2001) availableat http://
76

77

news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf), last visited April 22,
2004.
78

Id.

Saito, supra note 71, at 8-9 (citing Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (May 28, 2002)).
80 Saito, supra note 71, at 9 (quoting Supreme Court Allows Secrecy to Stand in
79

Deportation Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002).
81 Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061 (2002).
82
83
84

Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
Demleitner, supra note 75 at 1061.
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phrase which was coined in the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and expanded in
the IIRIRA of 1996. "Despite the term 'aggravated felonies,' not all of the
offenses falling under this heading are felonies, nor would most people consider some of them aggravated ... a conviction of an aggravated felony,
therefore, prohibits a court from considering outstanding equities," such as
having U.S. citizen spouses or children, or having no ties to their country of
85
origin.
The Patriot Act further expands the list of removable offenses. Section 411 of the Act permits "the Secretary of State [to] designate any group
that has ever engaged in violent activity, a 'terrorist organization.' This
legislation has the effect of denying admission to the group's non-citizen
members and would also make payment of membership dues a removable
offense. '' 86 Furthermore, since the definition of terrorist activity is so broad
under section 802 of the Patriot Act, "an immigrant who grabs a knife or
other weapon in an altercation or in committing a crime of passion, may be
87
subjected to removal as a 'terrorist."'
The effect of this legislation has been a dragnet type of approach of
law enforcement on aliens and immigrants. "Since September 11, 2001, the
United States has witnessed the mass arrests of Arab and Muslim immigrants. While none of these men have been charged with terrorism-related
offenses, 88 most of them have been held in immigration detention. Some
have been deported because of immigration violations or prior criminal
convictions which were not related to September 11 ."89
The effect of using immigration law as law enforcement, then, has
not yielded any positive results in the War on Terrorism. "As Senator Russ
Feingold has aptly noted, 'in a rush to find terrorists, the Department [of
Justice] appears to have disrupted the lives of hundreds of people, most of
whom will prove to be wholly innocent of any connection to terrorism.' "90
85

Id. at 1065-66.

Rita Shulman, USA PatriotAct: Granting the U.S. Government the Unprecedented Power to Circumvent American Civil Liberties in the Name of National
Security, 80 U. DET. MARCY L. REV. 427, 436-437 (2002).
86

87

Id. at 437.

Zacarias Moussauoi, who is currently the only man being charged with plotting
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, was already in custody before September
11, 2001 for a passport violation. See Christopher Drew, After the Attacks: The
88

Plot; Four People Flown to New York for Questioning in Connection With Attacks,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at A-4.
89 Demleitner, supra note 75, at 1059.
90 Marie A. Taylor, Immigration Enforcement Post-September 11: Safeguarding
the Civil Rights of Middle Eastern-American and Immigrant Communities, 17
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In fact, the use of such dragnet techniques may be harmful to the
war on terrorism. "For example, questioning 5,000 residents of Arab descent about possible terrorist plots may yield some information helpful to
national security, although even that is dubious, but in the long term it
alienates the very community from which the FBI or CIA can recruit informants to wage the long term fight against terrorism." 91
PART

HI:

BUSH ADMINISTRATION MILITARY PROCEEDINGS

On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued a Military Order,
titled "Detention, Treatment, and Trail of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
Against Terrorism. '92 In the context of the "War on Terrorism" and our
established legal system, the Order creates some confusion. The Order
guarantees "a full and fair trial," 93 yet has been criticized for denying "basic
constitutional rights, such as an independent court, a jury trial, an appeal to
independent judges, and a right to have full access to the evidence used to
support a conviction. '94 The rationale behind this, as President Bush put it,
was simple: "the option to use a military tribunal in a time of war makes a
lot of sense. 95 The confusion in this matter is best expressed by this statement, first because Congress alone has the power to declare war and has not
done so, 96 and second because the detainees are not being treated as prison97
ers of war and are not afforded the protection of the Geneva Convention.
"According to Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defense, 'the
detainees are not being labeled as prisoners of war because they did not
engage in warfare according to the precepts of the Geneva Convention GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 63, 112 (2002) (quoting DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our
Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on

the Judiciary, 107th Cong., Dec. 4, 2001 (opening statement of Sen. Russ Feingold
(D-Wis.))).
91 Lobel, supra note 66, at 771.
92 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
93 Id. §§ 4(c)(2), 4(c)(5), at 57,835.
94 George P. Fletcher, The Military Tribunal Order: On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635,

638 (2002).
95 Id. at 639 (quoting Paul Leavitt & Kevin Johnson, Bush Says Military Tribunals
Necessary "In Time of War", USA TODAY MAG., Nov. 20, 2001, at 5A).

96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
97 See Convention (No. III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, availableat http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/91.htm, last visited April 22, 2004.
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they hide weapons, do not wear uniforms and try to blur the line between
98
combatant and noncombatant.'In addition to the "enemy combatants" held at Guantanamo Bay,
the government is currently holding Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi in military brigs here in the United States, because both Padilla and Hamdi are
U.S. citizens. However, similar to the detainees at Guantanamo, and perhaps more similar to the immigrant detainees held here in the United States,
both Padilla and Hamdi are being held "without bail, criminal charges, access to attorneys or the right to remain silent." 99
Meanwhile, John Walker Lindh, a white American citizen, was
transferred from military to civilian custody. "The government has not explained why Hamdi's rights differ from those of Lindh, who has been notified of the charges against him and was brought before a civilian court with
all of the constitutional protections normally accorded criminal defendants,
including the right to counsel. The only factors that seem to distinguish the
two cases are race and national origin."' 10 0
It is important to note that these military tribunals offer significantly fewer protections for the accused then do U.S. civilian courts.
[M]ilitary tribunals may be closed proceedings, even to the
accused himself; there are no juries, defendants are judged
instead by a group consisting of between three and seven
members, where each member is a commissioned officer of
the United States military; military tribunals may be held
extraterritorially, e.g. in foreign countries or upon U.S. naval ships; defendants have no right to counsel while being
interrogated, and will not have the benefit of receiving exculpatory evidence in possession of the prosecution, as they
would if prosecuted in a non-tribunal setting; and guilt need
only "have probative value to a reasonable person," it need
not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 1
Anton L. Janik, Jr., Prosecuting Al Qaeda: America's Human Rights Policy
Interests Are Best Served By Trying Terrorists Under InternationalTribunals, 30
98

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 498, 512 (2002) (citing Jim Garamone, Mistreatment
Allegations "Just Plain False," AM. FORCES INFO. SERV., Jan. 22, 2002).
99 Anita Ramasastry, Do Hamdi and PadillaNeed Company?, FINDLAW WRIT,
2
Aug. 8, 2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/ 0020821.html, last vis-

ited April 22, 2004.
100 Saito, supra note 71, at 13.
101 Janik, supra note 92, at 510-11.
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In fact, the military tribunals do not even offer the protections guaranteed
by military courts-martial in the U.S., which:
include numerous due process safeguards, including the requirement of public proceedings and provisions protecting
the right of the accused to counsel of choice, to cross-examine witnesses, to not be forced to confess or testify
against himself, to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty, to have guilt established beyond reasonable doubt,
and to appellate review of convictions. Many of these fundamental protections were not provided for in the Presi1
dent's [Military Order]. 02

A.

History of Military Tribunals by Executive Order

The legal justification for Bush's military tribunals is questionable and thin
in many cases. The foundation of Bush's power to call the tribunals rests
with the Constitution and the president's power as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces. 103 Support also comes from mentions of the president's
power over procedure in military tribunals in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. 0 4n Furthermore, Congress did authorize Bush to use military force
against Al Qaeda.'0 5
The key elements of Bush's authority, however, come from case
law. The Supreme Court has ruled, albeit rarely, on the use of military
10 6
tribunals. According to the Court's ruling in U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
Congress lacks the authority to try civilians in military court. The executive's power to create military tribunals has precedent in the Civil War and
World War II.
During the Civil War, military commissions were used mainly
against suspected Confederates. 01 7 After the Civil War, the Supreme Court
U.S.: Use Courts-MartialRules for Military Commissions, HUMAN RIGHTS
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2001, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/12/Rumsfeld
1218.htm, last visited April 22, 2004.
103 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2.
104 See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000).
105 Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against
Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2003)).
106 350 U.S. 11, 76 S. Ct. 1 (1955).
107 Military commissions were also used against civilians, Democrats, and the Dakota Souix. For a brief account of these commissions, see Belknap, A PutridPedi102
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in Ex parte Milligan'08 ruled on the trial of a resident of Indiana accused of
treason.
[The Supreme Court] held that trying a citizen who was not
a member of the armed forces before such a tribunal, rather
than in a civilian federal court authorized by Congress, in
an area where such courts were open and satisfactorily administering criminal justice, violated both the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public trial before
an impartial jury and the Fifth Amendment's requirement
that all prosecutions not involving members of the military
be initiated by grand jury indictment. The Court rejected
the contention that the emergency created by a war justified
using military commissions in areas not within a theater of
operations. 109

This ruling came in a situation where the president had a Congressional
declaration of war, and yet he was still denied the right to try citizens in
military courts.
Years later, after the Second World War, the Court upheld the
power of the executive and the military to try foreign combatants in military
tribunals. In In re Yamashita,110 the Court held that:
[A]n important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military commander, not only to
repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who, in their attempt to
thwart or impede our military effort, have violated the law
of war.11'
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,112 the Supreme Court upheld the trial

and conviction of German prisoners of war that continued to fight against
well
the United States after the surrender of Germany, noting that it was
11 3
belligerents."
"enemy
over
jurisdiction
had
military
established that
gree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in HistoricalPerspective, 38
CAL. W.L. REV. 433 (2002).
108 71 U.S. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (1866).
109 Belknap, supra note 101.
110 327 U.S. 1, 66 S. Ct. 340 (1946).
111 Id. at 11.
112
113

339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936 (1950).
Id. at 786.
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In Ex parte Quirin,114 the men at trial in a military tribunal were not
in a foreign theatre of operations. In this case, several German soldiers
engaged in a sabotage mission in the United States. President Roosevelt
ordered that the saboteurs be tried in a military court in Washington, D.C.
Noting that civilian courts were functioning at the time (a reference to Milligan' 15), the Court held that "the law of war draws a distinction between
116 and that the acts of
... those who are lawful and unlawful combatants,"
the saboteurs "constitute an offense against the law of war which the Con117
stitution authorizes to be tried by military commission."'
The problem for the Bush administration is the historical "need" for
military courts. "During World War I, America wisely resisted subjecting
those who were not members of the armed forces to military justice.""'
Furthermore, the proceeding in Quirin was likely done in a military court
more for the protection of government agencies then for the protection of
military secrets. The proceedings were secret. "Had [Ex parte Quirin]
been public, the feverish adulation the [FBI] was receiving would have
cooled considerably, for it would have revealed that in the saboteur case,
the Bureau had been more blundering than brilliant. A public trial would
also have damaged the reputation of the Coast Guard."''119
In creating an unprincipled exception to [Milligan], the
Court fashioned new law pleasing not only to a World War
II Attorney General, but also to Vice President Dick Cheney. Quirin is one of the primary precedents Cheney cites
to justify the military commissions President Bush has au120
thorized to try Al Qaeda terrorists.
Furthermore, Roosevelt was acting with a Congressional declaration of war;
President Bush is not.
Since Roosevelt was held to be acting within his executive
power pursuant to Congress' declaration of war under Article 15 of the Articles of War, the Court did not determine
'to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has
constitutional power to create military commissions with317 U.S. 1, 63 S. Ct. 2 (1942).
115 Supra note 108.
116 Id. at 30-31.
117 Id. at 46.
118 Belknap, supra note 101, at 481.
119 Id. at 478.
114

120

Id. at 477.
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out the support of Congressional legislation.' Thus, the
case does not directly address the precise issue that arises
under the current Executive Order, leaving open the question of the legitimacy of the currently proposed military
tribunals in a time of undeclared war. 12 1
Bush's reliance on Congress' Authorization for use of Military Force is
misplaced. The Resolution, as the title suggests, only allows for the use of
force. 122 Nothing is specifically stated about the use of military tribunals.
B.

The Detention and Trial of U.S. Citizens

Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi seem to be trapped between these historical
rulings. They are both citizens, and seem to be protected by Ex parte Milligan, and yet the Bush administration has labeled them "enemy combatants," and since they were captured in Afghanistan, they would seem to fall
under the rulings of In re Yamashita and Johnson. The Fourth Circuit, in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 123 has ruled that:

no evidentiary hearing or factual inquiry [on the part of the
court] is necessary or proper, because it is undisputed that
Hamdi was captured in a zone of active combat operations
in a foreign country and because any inquiry must be circumscribed to avoid encroachment into the military affairs
entrusted to the executive branch."' 124
This line of reasoning harkens back to the Supreme Court's ruling
in Korematsu v. United States 125 that allowed for the detention of 120,000

citizens of Japanese ancestry without charge or trail because "the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and
felt constrained to take proper security measures."' 26 In 1984, the criminal
conviction of Fred Korematsu was overturned at a rehearing of the case,
where "unearthed documents had revealed that no military necessity existed
to justify the incarceration, and that government decision makers knew this

125

Whitehead, supra note 2, at 1121.
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2003).
316 F.3d 450 (2003).
Id. at 473.
323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193 (1944).

126

Id. at 223.

121
122

123
124
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at the time, and later lied about it to the Supreme Court." 127 The warning
left by Judge Patel at the rehearing, that "institutions, including courts, during national crisis must exercise close scrutiny and vigilance in order to
'protect all citizens from [ ] petty fears and prejudices,"'128 seems largely to
have been ignored. In line with the racist immigration rulings of the late
1800s, Korematsu legitimated and legalized the ill treatment of people by
the government because of nothing other then their race. 129
Critics of Bush's military tribunals echo the warning of Judge Patel.
Michael C. Doff, writing about the detention and trial of Yaser Hamdi,
warns:
[T]he government asserts that domestic courts have no authority to question the military's determination that a citizen is an enemy combatant. Yet the consequence of such a
determination is that the citizen may not be entitled to all of
the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights ....

if the

government's view prevails, and it alone decides who is an
enemy combatant, then there is nothing to stop it from declaring anyone - you, me, or Tom Daschle - an enemy

combatant who can be detained indefinitely without trial.130
Criticism of the Tribunals

Supporters of the military tribunals point out the positives of the procedures. Bruce Fein, former Associate Deputy Attorney General under the
Reagan administration, noted, "[a]t time of warfare, expedition is critical." 31 Secrecy is another advantage, as it would prevent the government
from making public sensitive or classified information. In the words of
John Ashcroft, "If]rankly, you don't want to compromise intelligence information in times of war. ' 132 Former Solicitor Robert Bork noted, "[a]n open
trial.., covered by television, would be an ideal stage for Osama bin Laden
127

Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: A "Con-

stant Caution" in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37 (2003) (citing Korematsu v.

United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1416-18 (N.D. Cal. 1984)).
128 Id. at 47 (citing Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420 (internal quotations omitted)).
129 See Serrano, supra note 120.
130 Michael C. Doff, Who Decides Whether Yaser Hamdi, or any Other Citizen, is
an Enemy Combatant?, FINDLAW WRIT, Aug. 21, 2002, at http://writ.news.find
law.com/dorf/20020821.html, last visited April 22, 2004.
131 Belknap, supra note 101 at 434.
132

Id.
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133
The military
to spread his propaganda to all the Muslims in the world."
from
be
protected
would
as
they
tribunals would also be beneficial to jurors,
34
1
reprisals from terrorists.
But many of these advantages can be achieved through other
35
outlines how classimeans. The Classified Information Procedures Act
fied information could be handled at trial. Furthermore, efforts were taken
at the 1993 World Trade Center bombing trial and the McVeigh trial to
protect classified information. For example, in the McVeigh trial:

the news media sought access to a variety of documents
that had been filed under seal. In granting partial access,
Judge Matsch specifically articulated the importance of
open criminal trials. Extensively quoting Chief Justice
Berger, he stressed the "crucial prophylactic aspects" of
public trials and the vital importance of "'satisfying the appearance of justice' . . . by allowing people to observe it."
At the same time, Judge Matsch carefully identified and
articulated certain circumstances where there is no tradition
1 36
of access and where secrecy is necessary.
Provisions were also made at the 1993 World Trade Center bombing trail to
137
protect the anonymity of the jurors.
Furthermore, what are the consequences of military courts that
beyond judicial rules or controls? It is interesting to note that the
well
seem
first grievance listed against King George III in the Declaration of Independence was that "[hie has affected to render the military independent of, and
superior to the civil power."' 138 These tribunals would constitute a similar
abuse of executive authority.
Keeping the tribunals secret and free from judicial oversight or appeal, Bush is clearly overexerting his powers as the president. The threat of
future attacks or the implied (yet undeclared) state of war does not allow the

133

Id.

Id. at 435.
135 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2003).
136 The Press and the Public's First Amendment Right of Access to Terrorism on
Trial: A Position Paper,57 THE RECORD 94, 138 (Winter/Spring 2002) (footnote
2
omitted), available at http://www.abcny.org/currentarticle/Medial%20Law% 0
Comm%20Report%20doc.pdf, last visited April 22, 2004.
137 Id. at 141.
138 DECL. OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
134
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executive to "escape control of executive powers ... through assuming his

39
military role."'
One of the greatest checks on Bush's military tribunals comes from
the First Amendment right to free access. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,140 the Supreme Court noted that "to work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice, and the
appearance of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe
it. " 141

Furthermore, the military tribunals blur the separation of powers in
the Constitution. President Bush is relying on his presidential powers as
Commander in Chief of the military as well as his power over foreign affairs as the basis for his authority to create the tribunals. 142 This may overlap, but surely does not trump, the judicial branch's right to hear cases and
controversies 43 or the legislative branch's power to establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.144 The Constitution clearly grants the legislative and judicial branches powers over courts. President Bush's reading of
executive power requires judicial deference that is greater than what was
shown in plenary power cases, where the matter is clearly within the legislative- and executive-dominated areas of immigration law and foreign
45
policy. 1
Even the U.S. State Department has criticized other countries for
using military tribunals such as the ones created by President Bush. In the
2000 edition of its annual Human Rights Report, the State Department criticized Egypt's use of military courts to try terrorist defendants, stating that
the courts:
have deprived hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be tried by a civilian judge... [and they]
do not ensure civilian defendants due process before an independent tribunal. While military judges are lawyers, they
are also military officers appointed by the Minister of Defense and subject to military discipline. They are neither as
139

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646, 72 S. Ct. 863

(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
140

448 U.S. 555, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).

at 571-572.
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
Id. at art. III, § 2.

141 Id.
142
143
'44

Id. at art. I, § 8.

145Id.

at art. I, § 8, art. III, § 2.
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independent nor as qualified as civilian judges in applying
146
the civilian Penal Code.
How can the government create military tribunals so strikingly similar to the ones that they criticized just a short time before? By doing so,
"Bush [has] undermined the anti-terrorist coalition, ceding to nations overseas the high moral and legal ground long held by U.S. justice. And on
what leg does the U.S. now stand when China sentences an American to
147
death after a military trial devoid of counsel chosen by the defendant?"
PART IV: FuTuRE OF THE PATRIOT ACT

Currently, the Patriot Act and many related issues are before courts all
across the country. The ACLU has led a charge against many of the enforcement and surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act and many aspects
of the military tribunals.148 Many of the suits challenging the Patriot Act
stem from the Freedom of Information Act, 49 but the Act has provisions
that exempt information that is expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings 50 or that has been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
15
defense or foreign policy.
The Patriot Act has a "Sunset" provision in section 224 that, on
December 31, 2005, would suspend the Act:
The Sunset provision was intended to give Congress and
the public the chance to evaluate how law enforcement exercised some of its broad new powers and to decide
whether the serious reduction of American privacy and
civil liberties brought about by the enactment of the USA
Patriot Act was worthwhile. Unfortunately, there is little or
U.S. State Dep't, Egypt: Country Reports On Human Rights Practices 2000
(2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/784.htm, last visited April 22, 2004.
147 Janik, supra note 91, at 498 (quoting William Safire, Editorial, A Rush to Bogus
Justice: The Bush Administration's Secret Military Tribunals Will Backfire in the
Battle Against Terrorism, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 27, 2001, at A- 11).
148 See ACLU, The ACLU in the Courts Since 9/11 (2004), at http://www.aclu.org/
files/openfile.cfm?id=11778, last visited April 22, 2004.
149 5 U.S.C. § 552.
150 Id. at § 552(b)(7)(A).
146

151Id.

at § 552(b)(1).
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no reporting currently required by intelligence agencies or
law enforcement about how they use these new powers. 152

The Sunset provision does not, however, cover the entire Act. "[M]ost of
the Act, including the provisions involving immigrants, new crimes, and
some of the new expended surveillance powers such as the 'sneak and peak'
searches are not included in the sunset provision."'153
The Bush administration has resisted submitting to Congressional
oversight of Patriot Act enforcement. 54 Section 904 of the Patriot Act allowed members of the executive branch, such as John Ashcroft and Donald
Rumsfeld, to defer the date for submitting required intelligence reports to
Congress for over a year, until February 2002.155 Ashcroft carried the argument one step further and stated:
Congress's power of oversight is not without limits ....In
some areas ... I cannot and will not consult you .... I

cannot and will not divulge the contents, the context, or
even the existence of such advice to anyone - including
Congress - unless the President instructs me to do so. I
cannot and will not divulge information, nor do I believe
that anyone here would wish me to divulge information,
that will damage the national security of the United States,
the safety of its citizens or our efforts to ensure the same in
156
an ongoing investigation.
The situation for civil liberties only looks to worsen in the near
future. The Department of Justice is currently drafting a sequel to the Patriot Act, dubbed "Patriot Act II." The new legislation would expand the
executive powers granted in the first Act and further erode civil liberties.
The Act would provide for the summary deportation of immigrants without
charges if the Attorney General suspects that the immigrant may be a risk to
national security. 157 Even immigrants who, according to John Ashcroft, do
not pose a suspected national security threat could still be deported without
a hearing if that person has committed a minor criminal offense, even in the
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distant past.1 58 The arrest of terrorism suspects could be kept secret., 59 The
members of groups that, under the first Patriot Act, were deemed terrorist
organizations because their activities are "dangerous to human life," could
be subject under Patriot Act II to the forfeiture of civil assets, new death
penalties, and an unprecedented power of the government to revoke U.S.
citizenship, which would leave people stateless, undocumented, and possibly subject to indefinite detention (see Part II, supra). 60
CONCLUSION

The only way to reverse the trend set by the Patriot Act and President George W. Bush's military tribunals is to speak out against them and
get them overturned by Congress. Public dissent and Congressional action
161
seem to be the only way to stop executive-branch abuses of power.
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will stop the Patriot Act
or Bush's military tribunals. While there is history behind many of the
immigration, enforcement, and tribunal provisions, that history is based on
racist and outdated Supreme Court rulings which, as Justice Jackson noted
in his now-famous dissent to the Korematsu ruling, "[lay] about like a
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
162
plausible claim of an urgent need."'
In discussing President Lincoln's suspension of civil liberties during the Civil War, the restrictions imposed during
World War I, and the World War II internment of Japanese
Americans, Chief Justice [William Rehnquist] says, in essence, that while such measures may be somewhat extreme,
these things happen in times of war and it is not the Court's
place to intervene. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, it
is best to allow such tings to be workied out politically for
history shows that "normal" constitutional protections
will
63
re-assert themselves when the crisis is over.'
The Chief Justice is not alone in his evaluation of the place of civil
liberties in society during a time of crisis or war. The Roman statesman
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Cicero noted "Silent leges inter arma," or "the power of law is suspended in
time of war."'164 Oliver Cromwell put it that "necessity hath no law."' 165
Franklin D. Roosevelt's Attorney General noted that "the Constitution has
not greatly bothered any wartime President."' 166
Even if this is all true, if the suspension of civil liberties during
time of war is warranted; if racist laws are allowed to dictate immigration
law; if the power of the executive is allowed to go on unchecked; if the
damage to our credibility worldwide is a tolerable consequence; if everything will "go back to normal" when the crisis is over; one fundamental and
glaring reality remains: this "war" is undeclared and is "a marathon... not
a sprint," and "is not something that begins with a significant event or ends
' 167
with a significant event."
"Going back to normal" will only happen, if at all, when George W.
Bush says it will happen. The "war" will end only when we are told that it
will end. The civil rights and liberties that are surrendered in the name of
crisis will only be returned when the unchecked and discretionary judgment
of the executive deems it safe to do so.
The rule of law is challenged when those in power can wield arbitrary power such as this. Simply put, the Constitution itself looses its meaning as long as danger is deemed an acceptable justification for the
suspension of civil liberties and constitutional protections.
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